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Abstract: China’s Belt and Road project, announced in 2013, has had a major impact 
on the world, and the ASEAN countries are, of course, not an exception. However, 
there is no consensus among the Member States on how to manage China, and 
therefore the response to the BRI was not uniform, either. Some countries regard 
the project as a threat, others as an opportunity, but they agree that dependency 
on China should be kept to a minimum. However, what role this effort plays in the 
Belt and Road project and how feasible it is, is a major question.
The study assumed that after 2013 (inter alia thanks to the BRI), ASEAN–
China relations have substantially improved and economic cooperation has been 
strengthened. To demonstrate this, by using economic indicators, we sought to 
create a benchmark by which to compare the impact of China on the economies of 
ASEAN countries. The results show which country is economically most dependant 
on China and whether each country’s related political narrative corresponds to the 
change of the economic data.
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Introduction
The purpose of this study was to present the relationship between the People’s 
Republic of China (China) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
countries in the light of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to our 
hypothesis, the Chinese project has had a major impact on the economies of the 
ASEAN countries, which has also increased their economic dependence on China. 
In order to demonstrate this, we examined the economic relations of these countries 
in the year (2012) before the BRI announcement (2013), taking into account their 
external trade balance and FDI, and looked at the same economic indicators on 
the basis of the 2018 figures, which allowed us to reject or confirm the hypothesis1. 
Due to the elusiveness of the BRI, it is very difficult to measure the impact and 
dependence on individual countries. Moreover, the issue of ASEAN Member 
States’ indebtedness to China should also be examined, but China does not issue 
data on this,2 so we do not have adequate sources. Due to the limited scope of 
this study, we only covered the relationship and economic interconnectedness of 
China and ASEAN countries, and only touched upon the political and economic 
relations with the United States of America and other major countries in the region, 
such as Japan, which also play a significant role. It is clear that a number of other 
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factors – which mainly means geostrategic, political, and cultural considerations 
– also influence the impact of BRI, a reference to which was made briefly in the 
study as well. Unfortunately, due to the size constraints, we could not undertake 
to explain them in detail, although given the heterogeneity of the region, a uniform 
interpretation of the dependence on China regarding the individual states is a tall 
order. We first looked at the development of relations between China and ASEAN, 
and next at the Member States and the evolution of their relations with China in the 
light of the BRI. By analysing the economic data separately for each country and 
aggregating them at the end, the study provides a comprehensive comparison of 
the development of China’s economic influence in the region before and after the 
BRI. We also made an attempt to examine and highlight the political links behind 
the development of economic relations. After the confirmation or refusal of the 
hypothesis, the results were used to draw conclusions on the development of the 
geopolitical situation in the region.
Review of China–ASEAN Relations
The relationship between ASEAN, established in 1967, and China can be divided 
into three stages. The initial hostile relationship was replaced by the “falling in love” 
era in the mid-1970s, during and after which close cooperation dominated their 
relations in the 1980-90s. However, from 2010, as economic interdependence 
increased, the relationship became more complex due to geopolitical conflicts 
(“phase of uncertainty”) (Mahbubani & Sng, 2017).
The ASEAN–China dialogue was established in 1991 and China became a 
full-fedged ASEAN dialogue partner in 1996. In 1997, the first informal ASEAN–
China Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), during which the leaders 
of both sides announced their decision to establish a 21st-century-oriented, good 
neighbourly partnership based on mutual trust between ASEAN and China. In 
November 2011, the ASEAN–China Centre (ACC) was formally established. As 
a single-contact information and activity centre, the ACC has taken on a role in 
promoting cooperation between ASEAN and China in the areas of trade, investment, 
education, culture, tourism, information, and media. The next milestone in relations 
was the year 2013, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Indonesia and 
Malaysia to intensify cooperation between ASEAN and China for a better common 
future. In this year, the Maritime Silk Road for the 21st century was also announced, 
which has a serious impact on the region and its ASEAN Member States. 2020 was 
designated as the ASEAN–China Year of Digital Economic Cooperation.
ASEAN and China have carried out close coordination and cooperation on 
international and regional issues. Both sides have jointly committed themselves to 
promoting a thorough development of regional cooperation in East Asia and have 
tackled the current and potential challenges of the region. The two parties have 
also maintained good communication and cooperation within the cooperation 
mechanisms, including the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea) 
Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the APEC, etc.
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Economic and Trade Cooperation
In November 2002, ASEAN and China signed the framework agreement on 
comprehensive economic cooperation, which entered into force in January 2010 
and launched the process of creating the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). 
According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, bilateral trade between ASEAN 
and China reached USD 641.46 billion in 2019, an increase of 9.2% compared to 
the previous year. China’s exports to ASEAN amounted to USD 359.42 billion, and 
Chinese imports from ASEAN amounted to USD 282.04 billion, which represented 
an increase of 12.7% and 5%, respectively. China has been the top trade partner of 
ASEAN for 11 years (ASEAN–China Centre, 2020). And since 2018, ASEAN has 
become China’s second most important trading partner (ahead of the United States) 
after the European Union (Xilian, 2019). 
According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, at the end of December 2019, 
investments between the ASEAN and China amounted to USD 236.91 billion. 
China’s investment in ASEAN reached USD 112.30 billion and ASEAN’s investment 
in China amounted to USD 124.61 billion. The year 2019 was the second time that 
ASEAN was the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign investment. ASEAN is 
the third largest investment source in China.
In the relations between Chine and ASEAN, tourism also plays an important 
role. In 2019, the total number of reciprocal visits exceeded 65 million, with around 
4500 flights per week between China and ASEAN Member States (ASEAN–China 
Centre, 2020).
The coronavirus pandemic opened a new chapter in economic relations between 
the two countries, since ASEAN became China’s largest trading partner in the first 
two months of 2020, overtaking the European Union. This has demonstrated that 
there is an unbreakable supply chain between Southeast Asia and China that even 
external shocks such as the coronavirus (Global Times, 2020) cannot tear. There 
is no doubt that, once the epidemic is over, the EU will take back its leading role, 
as it has a 2 to 3 times larger economy than ASEAN, but this shows how close the 
economic ties and the interdependency are between China and Southeast Asia.
BRI, the New 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road 
and the South China Sea
In autumn 2013, China announced a global project, known as the Belt and Road 
Initiative, which is another step toward greater Chinese engagement in the world. 
This way, the Beijing leadership, following the footsteps of the former caravan trails 
joining Europe and Asia, committed itself to the development and modernisation of 
transport networks, envisioned as a China-led (funded) international development 
program, which also meets Beijing’s geostrategic objectives by connecting 
remote regions to major trade routes (Klemensits, 2016). The project consists of 
land routes (connecting China to Central Asia, the Middle, East and Europe) and 
maritime routes (comprising the main commercial routes of Southeast Asia, Africa, 
10 Alexandra Zoltai & Péter Klemensits
Europe, and Oceania). The Belt and Road Initiative can be described as a network, 
which can be spatially expanded with great flexibility. China makes use of this 
exibility and, most recently, has extended the large-scale project with the Polar 
Silk Road (Zoltai, 2020). Its main concept is to link existing trade routes, reduce 
freight costs and increase protection, but it is also important to China because 
it can thus secure huge projects in the construction sector and Chinese goods 
can penetrate new markets. In addition to economic benefits, the initiative also 
has very important strategic benefits; the participating countries will become 
committed to China. It is therefore expected to go beyond simple Chinese-funded 
infrastructure developments, because its real objective is to promote regional 
cooperation, financial integration, free trade, and scientific cooperation (Scott, 
2016). The planned investments are to be financed by the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the Maritime Silk Road Bank. The Maritime Silk Road is also 
of great importance in diplomatic terms, and it is no coincidence that it has recently 
become a key element of Chinese foreign policy. According to China, infrastructure 
investments are not linked to political constraints, however, the interrelation of 
interests is indisputable. And in the case of ASEAN countries, the major strategic 
goal should not be forgotten either: Given the competition of China and the United 
States, the strengthening of Chinese influence in the region is a priority in both 
economic and political terms (Klemensits, 2018).
There are, therefore, serious diplomatic, economic, and strategic interests in 
the background. Firstly, the concept of the New Maritime Silk Road has been 
developed by China, inter alia, to reconcile and quiet neighbouring countries, which 
feel threatened by the aggressive Chinese territorial demands on the South China 
Sea (Yale, 2015).
Interdependence may be key to the future feasibility of the BRI. According to 
2018 data, the investment in the BRI to Southeast Asia exceeded USD 740 billion. 
At present, 13 projects have been proven to be operational, representing a very 
small proportion of the projects planned in the region (Kaneti, 2020).
However, Beijing’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, marked by the nine-
dash line, generates severe tensions in the region and even increases the presence 
of the US Navy. The situation was compounded by China’s refusal to accept the 2016 
ruling of the Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration, which has thus undermined the 
prestige of international law (Eszterhai, V. & Klemensits, P. 2016). China considers 
almost the entire South China Sea to be its own sovereign territory, which is in breach 
of the sovereignty of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, as 
these countries also have outstanding territorial demands.
Cambodia
Cambodia is considered to be one of China’s main partners in the Southeast Asian 
region. In addition to good diplomatic relations, China has undeniably become 
Cambodia’s largest economic partner, as it is the largest foreign investor, the largest 
bilateral donor, the largest trading partner, the largest buyer of Cambodian rice and 
also, the most tourists to the Southeast Asian country come from China. Since the 
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announcement of the BRI in 2013, Cambodia has been a strong supporter of the 
large-scale Chinese project and has great hopes that this initiative will be one of 
the foundations of the nation’s development. The development of infrastructure and 
physical connections has made significant progress in Cambodia, most of which are 
related to the BRI. The two most important projects are the Sihanoukville Special 
Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the planned Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, 
(Kha, 2019), about 20% of which is currently completed (Khmer Times, 2020).
The SSEZ, in itself, has contributed to increasing employment, as more than 
20,000 Cambodian employees have received jobs, and it has helped to employ 
low-skilled and female workers, both from Sihanoukville and other neighbouring 
provinces. Since trade in goods has become a driving force for growth in the 
country, the logistics sector is also of particular importance. At present, however, 
Cambodia lacks sufficient infrastructure capacity and significantly lags behind other 
countries in the region in logistics performance, leading to higher transport costs 
and seriously undermining the country’s competitiveness. The implementation of 
the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway could greatly improve the efficiency 
of the country’s logistics. This new infrastructure development would modernize 
the connection between Phnom Penh and the port of Sihanoukville, the only 
international deep-sea port in Cambodia. In 2017, it accounted for more than 90% 
of the total container turnover in the country (Kha, 2019).
Against this background, the increasing dependence of Cambodia on China 
must be taken into account. The Cambodian leadership is clearly responsible for 
managing the BRI-related projects properly so that the Cambodian population can 
also benefit from it. Any excessive dependence on China imposes certain limits on 
Cambodia’s foreign policy potential. The Cambodian elite has thus begun to move 
closer to China, which China has made use of, but ultimately the initiatives related to 
China and the BRI taken so far have benefited Cambodia. However, local criticism of 
these initiatives is often expressed regarding the lack of quality and transparency of 
Chinese investments and the low benefit for the people who live there (Kha, 2019).
In 2012, trade with China accounted for 2.17% of Cambodia’s total exports and 
22.3% of its imports. In 2018, exports increased to 6.92% and imports to 25.1% 
between the two countries. Between 2012 and 2018, China was the second fastest 
growing export market (+ 413%) and the third fastest growing import market (117%) 
for Cambodia (OEC. Cambodia). In 2018, 19.6% of all FDI in Cambodia was from 
OFDI from China (Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018).
Myanmar
There is an interdependence between Myanmar and China on security issues. When 
the international community imposed sanctions against Myanmar for violations of 
human rights and isolated the country, the regime, which had been seized with 
military support, received support from China to ensure its survival, so that China 
could become the international ally of the military junta in Myanmar. In addition, 
China was the main source of military equipment and training for Myanmar, while 
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China needed Myanmar’s cooperation to enforce its own security interests. China is 
building port facilities in Myanmar, which are of strategic importance in its access to 
the Indian Ocean (Chen, 2019).
In January 2020, Xi Jinping made an official visit to Myanmar on the occasion of 
the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relationship between the two countries, and they 
also strengthened bilateral cooperation. Xi Jinping’s visit focused mostly on the 
Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and the deep-sea port. The agreements 
signed during the visit include a railway line linking the Chinese Kunming (Yuannan 
Province in southern China) to Kyaukphyu touching Muse and Mandalay, which are 
located in the northern and middle part of Myanmar, as well as the new Yangon 
City project developed by the China Communications Construction Company 
(CCCC). The projects are all linked to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor 
(CMEC), which is part of the Chinese BRI. Myanmar is of particular importance 
to Beijing’s geostrategic plans; the country provides China access to the Indian 
Ocean. The Indian Ocean offers significant shipping routes to China to import oil 
from the Middle East. Land routes are already in use, the Kyaukphyu pipelines 
have been transporting gas from Myanmar all the way to Kunming since 2013 and 
oil since 2017, allowing Beijing to avoid the South China Sea and the strategically 
vulnerable Malacca Strait. 
Myanmarese State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi recognized the need 
to accelerate economic growth in her country and to develop the necessary 
infrastructure, and therefore agreed to the implementation of the China–Myanmar 
Economic Corridor connecting Kyaukphyu and Kunming at a meeting with Xi Jinping 
in Beijing in 2017. Myanmar’s leadership has a strong sympathy with the Chinese 
Communist Party and favours Chinese companies to accelerate economic growth 
in Myanmar and improve its underdeveloped infrastructure (Marston, 2019).
Outside ASEAN, China, India, Japan, and South Korea have also increased 
their bilateral trade flows with Myanmar and China has become its main trading 
partner. Although Thailand remains the largest destination for Myanmarese 
exports, China has been its largest foreign partner since 2011. Data recorded 
in 2012 show that 37.7% of the total Myanmarese imports came from China, 
while 15.8% of its total export flowed into China. In 2018, 24.7% of Myanmarese 
exports were destined for China, which made China the second largest destination 
for Myanmarese exports after Thailand. China accounted for 39.6% of the total 
Myanmarese imports with a slight drop, but still ahead of Thailand (17.2%). As a 
result, Myanmar’s domestic consumption continues to rely heavily on products 
and services originating in China. Between 2012 and 2018, China was the 
fastest growing export (+301%) and import market (+89.4%) (OEC. Myanmar). 
In 2004, the Chinese FDI in Myanmar accounted for only 1.9% of China’s total 
foreign investment. However, following the imposition of economic sanctions by 
Western countries in the early 2000s against the leadership which was declared 
to be repressive, China started to make significant investments in Myanmar and 
became the largest foreign investor by 2011. In 2018, Chinese OFDI in Myanmar 
already accounted for 14.9% of all of its foreign investment (Zhōnghuá rénmín 
gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018).
13What do China and the BRI Mean to ASEAN Economies?
Foreign Policy Review
Laos
Laos is one of the smallest and poorest countries within ASEAN. Approximately 
61% of its 6.8 million inhabitants are of working age, so the country is a popular 
target for labour-intensive industries. Export and tourism are the main drivers of the 
country’s economic growth, but its trade volume is rather small and its main trading 
partners are its immediate neighbours: Thailand, China, and Vietnam (Wroblel, 2019).
China and Laos established diplomatic relations in 1961, but the tensions 
between the two countries remained during the Cold War. Rapprochement only 
occurred in the 1990s and 2000s, and the countries’ relations reached the level 
of a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2009. There are still many conflicts 
in the relations between the two countries (whether it be local dissatisfaction 
with particular Chinese infrastructure projects or the concern that Vientiane is too 
reliant on Beijing), but bilateral cooperation is still developing.
One of the most important initiatives between the two countries is currently 
the railway project between China and Laos, which, once completed, will be the 
longest railway line in Asia  located outside China. The project is a 414 km railway 
line from the town of Boten on the Laos-China border to Vientiane. Trains will 
be able to run at a speed of 160 km/h on the line, which includes 198 km of 
tunnels and 62 km of bridges. Of course, the whole project is part of the BRI, 
the main objective of which is to channel the landlocked country into trade and 
transform it into a continental hub. The project started in 2016 and is expected 
to be completed by the end of 2021 (Parameswaran, 2020). As Laos is a rather 
poor country with limited natural resources, it is highly vulnerable to the Chinese 
initiative (Lintner, 2019).
Trade with Thailand dominates the foreign economy of Laos: in 2018, 51.2% of 
its export flows to Thailand, while 66.9% of its import comes from there. Second, 
however, is China, representing 31.7% of exports and 22.6% of imports in the total 
Lao trade. China’s share grows more year by year compared to that of Thailand, 
but the difference is still significant. Between 2012 and 2018, the second fastest 
growing export (+117%) and import market (+48.9%) was China after Thailand 
(OEC. Laos). In 2010, it preceded Thailand as the largest foreign investor. In 
2003, the Chinese OFDI amounted to 1.5% of all FDI in Laos. In 2012, however, 
it increased to 58.8% and in 2018 to 87% of the total Lao FDI (Zhōnghuá rénmín 
gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018). The figures show that Laos is highly dependant 
on China, which, on the one hand, places the country in a difficult situation and, 
on the other hand, represents a potential for Lao development.
Vietnam
China’s relationship with Vietnam is greatly influenced by their history and the South 
China Sea, which is still a source of conflict. However, Vietnam is in favour of the BRI 
Initiative, yet cautious about the related Chinese loans. There are several factors 
involved: for example, mistrust toward Beijing and the strategic consequences of 
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debt to China for the South China Sea dispute as well as unfavourable conditions 
for Chinese loans. Vietnam’s participation in the BRI is therefore rather modest 
and slow, although the country is in dire need of infrastructure development. 
The first infrastructure project under the BRI Initiative is the Cat Linh–Ha Dong 
metro line in Hanoi, which has been under construction since October 2011 and 
subsequently recognized as part of the BRI by both parties. The total construction 
is worth USD 552 million, of which USD 419 million is provided by the Chinese 
Eximbank. In the meantime, the investment cost has almost doubled, and China 
has granted new loans. Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam in 2017 led to an agreement 
to support the “Two Corridors, One Belt” (TCOB) initiative and thus the BRI. The 
main objective of the initiative is to provide better rail connection between China 
and Vietnam (Hiep, 2018).
Vietnam’s budget deficit remains high, which means that investment in state-
funded infrastructure projects is still not expected, and therefore the country 
remains interested in the BRI. It is likely to participate in pilot projects, but for 
fear of increasing public debt, it will rather encourage private investors to take 
out loans. Given the relationship between the two countries, there is no doubt that the 
BRI will face significant challenges in Vietnam; for example, if the South China Sea 
dispute intensifies, Vietnam will become more sensitive to the political and strategic 
consequences of the BRI. However, if the situation continues to be peaceful, there is 
a great chance of a stronger commitment from Vietnam (Hiep, 2018).
This also shows that Vietnam seems to be trying to avoid economic dependence 
on China. However, it is becoming less and less able to do so with regard to 
imports. In 2012, trade with China accounted for 11.3% of Vietnam’s total exports 
and 25.3% of its imports. In 2018, exports increased to 19.6% and imports to 
32.9% between the two countries. Between 2012 and 2018, China was the fastest 
growing export (+271%) and import market (174%) for Vietnam (OEC. Vietnam). 
In 2012, Chinese FDI amounted to USD 1.6 billion in Vietnam, while by 2018, 
it was almost four times higher, increasing to USD 5.6 billion. In 2018, 3.8% 
of all FDI in Vietnam was from Chinese OFDI, thus the country tries to remain 
independent from China in terms of foreign direct investments (Zhōnghuá rénmín 
gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018).
Thailand
During the financial crisis in Asia, the relationship between China and Thailand has 
continued to grow and intensify due to economic cooperation. However, since Xi 
Jinping’s assuming of power, the anti-Chinese voices in the country have become 
stronger. In particular, the younger generation was disappointed with the leadership 
taking office in 2014, when they became too committed to China, and public opinion 
is rather sceptical about the Thai–Chinese railway agreement and its bad interest rate 
conditions, which cause serious concerns about drifting into a debt trap. Thailand’s 
economy is highly dependant on Chinese tourists, which also causes disapproval 
from local people (Bunyavejchewin, 2020).
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The railway project under the BRI Initiative would link Bangkok to Nong Khai, 
located in the North of Thailand, by high-speed rail technology imported from China. 
This would make it possible to reach China and Kunming through Laos. Therefore, 
the construction of the Thailand–China high-speed railway line is a priority project 
within the BRI, and the connection with the capital of Laos, Vientiane, would also be 
crucial to Thailand’s economy, as it would reduce trade costs. On the basis of the 
preliminary negotiations, it appears that the project will have a moderate impact on 
Thailand’s debt. The Thai Government is going to spend USD 5.8 billion for the first 
phase of the project, which will cover roughly half of the line’s costs (estimated at 
USD 9.9 billion based on 2017 figures, accounting for 2% of Thailand’s economy). 
However, the funding proposed by the Thai Government seems to be rather careful 
and prudent, with at least 80% of the project being funded from internal sources in 
Thai baht and the remaining 20% in US dollars from external debt (Lam, 2019).
Thailand is the second largest economy in ASEAN, and unlike domestic fears, 
its economy is quite balanced. In 2012, trade with China accounted for 13.1% of 
Thailand’s total exports and 15.4% of its imports. In 2018, exports fell to 11.8% and 
imports increased to 20.1% between the two countries, and in the same year, China 
was Thailand’s main trading partner in both respects. Between 2012 and 2018, China 
was the fastest growing import market (+26.3%) for Thailand (OEC. Thailand). In 
2018, 2.6% of all FDI in Thailand was from Chinese OFDI, thus the country tries to 
remain independent from China in terms of foreign direct investments (Zhōnghuá 
rénmín gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018).
Indonesia
The development of Indonesian–Chinese relations started from the end of the Cold 
War, since the Suharto Government only established diplomatic relations with China 
in 1990. However, economic and political cooperation remained limited until the late 
2010s. Regarding the Maritime Silk Road, for China, the archipelagic state is the 
most important Southeast Asian country for geostrategic and geo-economic reasons. 
Besides the Malacca Strait, both the Lombok Strait and the Sunda Strait allow the 
largest country in the region to control the strategically important maritime trade 
routes along which most of the Chinese export-import passes. Therefore, it can 
be stated that without Indonesia’s participation, the whole initiative would fail 
(Parameswaran, 2018). However, the Indonesian and the Chinese governments 
soon agreed: according to President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) concept, he 
aspired to turn his country into a “Global Maritime Fulcrum” between the Pacific 
and the Indian Ocean, and Chinese plans are completely adapted to this idea. 
Although Indonesia is the world’s biggest archipelago, the infrastructure is 
deeply underdeveloped. The government lacks sufficient financial resources 
and hopes that China will provide them (in the form of loans and aid). Presently 
Indonesia is the biggest economy in ASEAN and by 2030 it is projected to be the 
7th biggest economy in the world; hence the bilateral relationship is especially 
important to China. 
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In November 2014, President Jokowi pledged himself “to improve Indonesia 
as a trade nation through the construction and upgrading of its maritime 
infrastructure, including 24 strategic ports and five deep-sea ports.” (Duquennoy – 
Zielonka, 2015). The aim is to boost Indonesia’s connectivity, trade opportunities, 
and attractiveness for foreign investments. China correctly realised that it is an 
enormous business opportunity, since Jakarta wants to build these facilities all 
over the country in the near future, mainly with the help of Chinese companies. 
The joint Indonesian–Dutch–Chinese development of the Kuala Tanjung port 
started in 2015 (at a cost of USD 2.5 billion), during which the construction of 
the multipurpose terminal, industrial zone, and container port has already been 
completed, while the integrated industry zone connected to the port is expected 
to be completed by 2023 (Gunawan, 2019). A flagship project of the BRI, the 
150 km long Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway (costing USD 5.9 billion), is 
expected to be completed by 2021 (CSIS, 2020) from the Chinese loan. Besides 
the development of the Lembeh International Airport, construction of the Kayan 
River Hydropower Plant has also begun. The development of tourism has also 
received priority attention: In the West of Java, covering 3000 ha, the MNC Lido 
City, a commercial, residential, entertainment, and leisure complex is being 
built. And in North Sumatra, next to Lake Toba, a Tourism District, comprising 
10 villages, is currently being established (Parama, 2020). The investments are 
part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridor, which comprise North 
Sumatra, North Kalimantan, North Sulawesi and Bali.
The development of economic relations is well reflected by the fact that China 
has been Indonesia’s largest trading partner for nine years now. The most tourists 
also come from China (an average of 2 million people per year). In 2012, 15.1% 
of Indonesian exports were destined for Japan, with China in second place by 
12.3%. China took the lead in 2018 with 14.3%, while Japan returned to the 
second position with 10.3%. As far as imports are concerned, China was the main 
partner already in 2012 with 15.9%, increasing to 24.3% by 2018. Thanks to this, 
China was the fastest growing import market (+45.7%) between 2012 and 2018 
(OEC. Indonesia). In 2018, the country received Chinese investments worth USD 
1.86 billion, meaning that 5.7% of all FDI in the country was from Chinese OFDI 
(Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018).
Malaysia
Malaysia was the first ASEAN country to diplomatically engage with China in 1974, 
and the Malaysian governments considered close cooperation with Beijing to be a 
priority. Under the Prime Ministry of Najib Tun Lazak (2009-2018), the country has 
made a firm commitment to the BRI, and Chinese projects have been expected 
to significantly benefit the economy. In the framework of this, an agreement has 
been concluded on the establishment of the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial 
Park, as a result of which China implemented infrastructural investments in 
the port of Kuantan, located on the eastern shore of the Malaysian Peninsula. 
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Malaysia’s first industrial park, which has been granted national status, was built 
on 685 ha, and mainly hosts the steel, electronics, communication technology, 
and renewable energy industry (MCKIP, 2020).
In 2014, the Malacca Gateway Project, which is largely financed by Chinese 
companies, was launched, which includes the establishment of a vital deep-water 
port in the Strait of Malacca. The Malacca industrial park is also one of the main 
components of the project. Within this framework, the aim is to build 3 reclaimed 
artificial islands and develop one natural island for touristic purposes, with the 
exception of Pulau Melaka, which has to become a maritime activities centre (FMT 
News, 2017). One of the most ambitious BRI projects in Southeast Asia has since 
been significantly delayed, even though it received the green light from the new 
Malay Government in 2019. 
Following the change of government in 2018, Mahathir bin Mohamad suspended 
the ongoing BRI projects, notably the East Coast Railway Line, the Multi-Product 
Pipelines, and the Trans-Sabah Gas Pipelines, on the grounds of the country’s 
difficult economic situation. The 640 km long East Coast Railway Line aims to 
establish communication between the East and the West of Malaysia, which is also 
of vital interest to China in order to avoid the Malacca Strait. Once the conditions 
have been renegotiated (Malay companies were granted a 40% share of the 
construction and the total costs have been reduced to USD 10.7 billion), Mahathir’s 
Government revived the project in 2019, which is expected to be completed by 2026 
(Railway technology, 2020). Mahathir has also expressed support for the Bandar 
Malaysia project, which is a mixed-use, transit-oriented development (TOD) in the 
capital city. The project is located at the terminus of a new high-speed rail line, 
which, when completed, will connect Kuala Lumpur to Singapore. The development 
affects an area of 196.7 ha and costs as much as USD 33.6 billion. The Forest City 
project, being built from a USD 100 billion investment, will also continue. It aims to 
establish a city quarter in the Johore Strait opposite Singapore, covering an area 
of 30 km2, which would include commercial, industrial, and residential buildings, 
ensuring the livelihood of 700,000 people (Clark, 2020).
Malaysia is the world’s 35th largest economy in terms of GDP, and China is 
a very important partner. In 2012, 15.5% of Malaysian exports were destined 
for China, while 15.9% of imports came from there. In 2018, China’s share of 
Malaysian exports decreased to 13.4%, while its share of imports increased to 
21.2%. Between 2012 and 2018, China was the fastest growing import market 
(+46.1%) for the country (OEC. Malaysia). In 2018, 5.4% of all FDI in Cambodia 
was from OFDI from China (Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018).
Philippines
The Philippines, under President Rodrigo Duterte’s Presidency from 2016, 
realized that the improvement of economic relations with China was of strategic 
importance. Duterte started to form his new, admittedly “independent” foreign 
policy, which – in contrast with his predecessor, President Benigno Aquino – 
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has totally redefined the country’s foreign and security policy strategy, the most 
striking aspect of which is its turning from the United States and opening towards 
China. Duterte tries to establish good relations with both the rival major powers, and 
he would not like to relinquish the US investments either, but whereas these have 
not been able to meet even the infrastructural needs, it is clear that there is a need 
to look for new partners. China’s positive attitude paved the way for Duterte’s official 
visit to the country, held between October 18 and 21. It is no coincidence that he was 
accompanied in his visit to Beijing by more than 400 businessmen: the improvement 
of  economic relations was of key importance. Finally, 21 different agreements 
have been signed in total, worth USD 24 billion, of which USD 15 billion is Chinese 
investment, together with a credit facility of USD 9 billion (Calonzo & Yap, 2016).
The country would not like to be excluded from China’s 21st-century Maritime Silk 
Road Project, therefore, most of the investments are infrastructural developments. 
In November 2018, the government announced that 12 of the 35 flagship projects 
would be implemented from Chinese loans and aid. At that time, the first round of 
projects included the pump station to be built on the Chico river (2.7 billion peso); 
the Kaliwa Dam (10.9 billion peso); a railway project (151.3 billion peso); and the 
Binondo–Intramuros and Estrella–Pantaleon bridges (Padin, 2018).
The second round of investments are planned to include: The first phase of 
the Safe Philippines project; the Subic–Clark railway; 5 bridges over the Pasig-
Marikina River and the Manggahan Canal; and the drainage projects of the Rio 
Grande de Mindanao river (De Vera, 2018). Most recently, in October 2019, the 
two parties agreed on the details of financing the Panay–Guimaras–Negros Bridge 
and the Davao high-speed rail. According to the Duterte Government, the country’s 
participation in the New Maritime Silk Road initiative of the 21st-century will 
clearly improve the international competitiveness of the country, as infrastructure 
improvements will reduce the cost of trade with China, as well as Europe, the Middle 
East, and Africa. New markets will open up to Philippine industry and agriculture, 
while millions of new jobs are created. However, despite the spectacular plans, very 
few projects have reached the implementation phase by 2020. Red tape, resistance 
of the military circles, caution on the Chinese side, environmental concerns, or 
even fear of a debt trap have slowed the majority of investments, or, in some cases, 
even shut them down temporarily or definitively.
After Indonesia and Thailand, the Philippines has the third largest economy in 
ASEAN, with a stable annual GDP growth of over 6% in recent years. By 2019, 
China became the largest trading partner of the Philippines and one of the most 
popular tourist paradises (Xinhua, 2019). In 2012, the country conducted 23.4% of 
its exports with China (the largest export market), which decreased to 13.6% by 
2018, while it must be noted that the largest export market has become Hong Kong 
(14.2%). As far as imports are concerned, China was the main partner already 
in 2012 with 12.7%, increasing to 24% by 2018. Between 2012 and 2018, China 
was the fastest growing import market (+238%) (OEC. Philippines). However, 
contrary to government plans, Chinese investment in the country has not increased 
significantly: In 2018, only 1% of all FDI was from Chinese FDI (Zhōnghuá rénmín 
gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018).
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Singapore
The Malacca Straits and Singapore are of strategic significance, but due to the power 
of the city-state, Chinese influence may be considered minimal here. Nevertheless, 
China also committed itself to Singapore to strengthen the cooperation. In 2016, 
considerable progress was made in this respect since, according to the agreement 
between the China Construction Bank Corporation and International Enterprise 
Singapore, USD 21 billion were allocated to support infrastructure projects (China 
Daily, 2016). Singapore has favoured the BRI from the outset, focusing in particular 
on infrastructure, financial connectivity, and investment in third countries. In April 
2019, the two parties signed an extended agreement on e-commerce, logistics, and 
professional services, while creating a USD 500 million financial fund for infrastructure 
development in Southeast Asia (Wei, 2019). In order to improve land connectivity, 
Singapore and Malaysia started building the 350 km long Kuala Lumpur–Singapore 
high-speed railway worth USD 11 billion in 2017, which is scheduled to start operating 
in 2031 (Railway technology, 2020). The BRI project is part of the planned Kunming–
Singapore railway line. Despite the positive attitude of the government, some 
consider that the 21st-century New Maritime Silk Road could lead to the loss of the 
formerly unique shipping hub nature of the Singapore port, as China’s improvements 
in Malaysia and the land routes could cause a decrease in trade ows.
China is Singapore’s largest trading partner, while the city-state is China’s largest 
foreign investor. In 2012, Hong Kong was still the main destination for exports from 
Singapore with 12.4%, while China was the second destination with 10.9%. In 2018, 
most of Singapore’s exports were already directed to China with 13.7% and Hong 
Kong was second place with 12.9%. As far as imports are concerned, China had a 
share of 10.8% as the largest partner in 2012, which increased to 14.6% by 2018. 
Between 2012 and 2018, China was the fastest growing export market (+43.4%) for 
Singapore (OEC. Singapore). In 2018, China held a 3.3% share of the country’s FDI 
stock (Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018). In this year, the city-state was 
the largest foreign investment destination for China along the BRI, capturing close to 
23% of the total investment outflow from China to Belt and Road countries (Wei, 2019).
Brunei
The Sultanate is primarily linked to China by economic ties, since Brunei is strongly 
in favour of the BRI project, and China has also promised assistance in diversifying 
its economy. The Brunei economy is essentially based on oil and gas extraction, but 
the depletion of stocks may cause serious problems in the future and low oil prices 
have already led to a recession. However, the investment in infrastructure offered by 
China and the increase in trade flows can be a solution to the problems. One of the 
largest BRI projects, the construction of an oil refinery started in 2017 by Hengyi 
Industries and Brunei’s partner, with a total cost of USD 3.4 billion, was completed 
in 2019. The other project, the Brunei–Guangxi Economic Corridor, which includes 
investment of nearly USD 500 million, is aimed at the reconstruction of the Muara 
port and the creation of an agricultural and medical park. Within this framework, 
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in 2017, a joint venture company formed by China’s Guangxi Beibu Gulf Port Group 
and Brunei’s Darussalam Asset took over the operation of Muara Container Terminal, 
the largest container terminal in the country (China Daily, 2017). 
In recent years, economic relations between the two countries have been 
considerably strengthened. In 2012, Japan accounted for 45.1% of Brunei’s exports, 
while China represented 2.58%. In 2018, although Japan’s predominance decreased 
(33.2%), China’s share increased to only 3.76%. As for imports, in 2012, China 
followed after Singapore and Malaysia with 11%, but in 2018 it became the top 
partner, with 33.9%. Between 2012 and 2018, China was the fastest growing import 
market (+191%) for Brunei (OEC. Brunei). In 2018, 3.3% of all FDI in Brunei was from 
Chinese OFDI, thus the country is still largely independent from China in terms of 
foreign direct investments (Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó shāngwù bù, 2018).
Conclusion
In light of the above, our hypothesis has been proven, namely that the BRI has 
had a serious impact on the economies of ASEAN countries, which has also led 
to an increase in their economic dependence on China. However, the data also 
show that there are significant differences between countries due to geographical, 
geostrategic, economic, and cultural reasons. In mainland Southeast Asia, the 
economies of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are heavily dependant on China, 
but in Thailand and Vietnam, despite the growing position of China in the areas 
of external trade and FDI, the efforts of the latter states to balance themselves 
between the major powers and preserve their distance from Beijing are 
considered effective. Looking at the Pacific, it can be concluded that in the case 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, their economic relations with China 
have become increasingly strong – the fluctuation of political relations set aside –, 
manifested mainly in the volume of BRI projects and the shift in external trade balance. 
In Singapore’s and Brunei’s relations with China, this trend is also observed, 
while the economic benefits for the latter are more apparent than for the other 
countries. The strengthening of economic relations between ASEAN states and 
China also has significant geopolitical consequences, the most prominent aspect 
of which is the strengthening of Chinese influence, together with the decline of 
US power in the region.
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Endnotes
1 The data relating to China exclude Hong Kong.
2 As a result of the crisis caused by the coronavirus, at the initiative of the World 
Bank, the world’s 73 poorest countries’ debt towards each country has been 
made public in order to help developed countries manage their debt. However, 
only Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos belong to this group, so a full comparison 
cannot be made and no data were provided before 2019. (The Economist, 2020).
